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FOREWORD
DAVID MICHAELS*
NEIL VIDMAR**

Law is heavily dependent on other disciplines when it is called upon to
exercise one of its main functions, namely, resolving disputes. Through the use
of experts, legal decisionmakers consider evidence bearing on the contested
facts at issue in the litigation. But problems frequently arise over the differences
in legal assumptions about evidence and how it is to be used and assumptions
brought by other disciplines—science among them—about the use of evidence.
The disjuncture occurs because the conventions used in the law and in other
disciplines differ.
This issue of Law and Contemporary Problems is devoted to exploring the
conflict between the conventions used in law and the conventions used in these
other disciplines. A “convention” is a generally agreed-upon practice within a
group or a discipline that facilitates communication and social interaction. It is a
rule of discourse or behavior that is generally understood without further
explanation or justification, making it efficient but also a source of confusion
when the conventions of one group are used in another group’s venue. Even
closely related disciplines may have conventions different enough to cause
confusion. Law has many conventions involving both substantive and
procedural matters. Yet legal decisionmakers are highly dependent on experts
from other disciplines to provide evidence upon which their decisions will be
grounded. The appearance of the expert—whether a scientist or an expert from
the field of history, economics, political science, or art—sets the scene for a
classic example of clashing conventions. The styles of discourse, warrants for
belief, standards of evidence, and other conventions are often so vastly different
between law and other disciplines that they are sources of mischief and
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confusion for legal decisionmakers as well as for the experts from these
“outside” disciplines who enter into the legal arena.
For example, the conventions of scientific discourse in the scientific setting
and evidentiary conventions of testifying before a trier of fact in a legal setting
differ significantly. In the scientific context it is customary (“conventional”) to
discuss the many sides of an issue, often in a stylized “on the one hand, on the
other hand” manner. On the witness stand, by contrast, the scientist is
encouraged to present one side, leaving the experts on the opposing side to
present “on the other hand.” Indeed, the rules of presentation in a legal forum
severely constrain a balanced presentation. The legal conventions for
presenting evidence in common-law, adversarial proceedings are considered a
necessary part of providing the judge and jury with clean and understandable
arguments about the two sides of a dispute, but they represent an unnatural
mode of discourse for scientists and members of other academic disciplines.
The articles in this issue of Law and Contemporary Problems are the output
of the Fourth Coronado Conference on Scientific Knowledge and Public Policy.
The conference was convened by the Project on Scientific Knowledge and
Public Policy (SKAPP), based at the George Washington University School of
Public Health and Health Services. SKAPP was founded in 2001 by a group of
scientists who recognized the value of examining how science is used and
misused in government decisionmaking and in legal proceedings.1 Since then,
SKAPP has convened four Coronado Conferences. At each one a group of
distinguished scientists, philosophers of science, judges, and policy experts
presented papers and discussed issues at the intersection of science, law, and
public policy. The papers presented at the first Coronado Conference, entitled
“Scientific Evidence and Public Policy,” were published in the American
Journal of Public Health;2 the second, “Sequestered Science: the Consequences
of Undisclosed Knowledge,” in Law and Contemporary Problems;3 and the
third, “Truth and Advocacy: The Quality and Nature of Litigation and
Regulatory Science,” in Environmental Health Perspectives.4
In this issue’s first article, Irreconcilable Differences?, Susan Haack provides
a brief historical background to the use of scientific experts in law and then
proceeds to discuss in greater detail the values underlying scientific inquiry, the
uncertainty in the quest of knowledge and understanding, and the methods by

1. At the time of this conference, major support for SKAPP was provided by the Common
Benefit Trust, a fund established pursuant to a court order in the Silicone Gel Breast Implant Products
Liability litigation. This funding was unrestricted; the funders were not provided the opportunity to
review or approve SKAPP publications. The papers presented at each Coronado Conference, along
with other scholarly publications of SKAPP staff, are available for downloading at no cost from
www.DefendingScience.org.
2. 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH (SUPPLEMENT 1) S1 (2005).
3. Symposium, Sequestered Science: the Consequences of Undisclosed Knowledge, 69 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (Summer 2006).
4. Mini-Monograph, 116 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 116 (2008).
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which consensus is reached, even if that consensus is always tentative.5 She then
contrasts scientific inquiry with the law’s quest for “truth” in the courtroom
and, particularly, the normative and temporal considerations that drive legal
decisionmaking. She also emphasizes the selection process by which adversarial
lawyers selectively choose experts who will offer evidence congruent with their
clients’ positions, often producing evidence that is “marginal” to mainstream
scientific thinking. She also discusses the constraints on fully exploring
disagreements and ambiguity in the current level of knowledge within any one
area of scientific knowledge.
Jerome Ravetz’s essay both expands on and disagrees with parts of Haack’s
view.6 He argues that the notion of “pure science” that seems to underlie
Haack’s description may ignore some historical realities. As an example, he
notes that scientists in late-nineteenth-century Germany collaborated with their
more practically oriented colleagues to produce knowledge. He then compares
that collaboration to the present-day use of scientific research in the regulatory
process, which informs policy even when scientific knowledge is uncertain and
subject to major revisions, including revisions that contradict earlier knowledge.
In short, unlike the ideal model of science, the reality of scientific research does
not follow a single, overarching method of inquiry. Ravetz also makes the
important point that in legal proceedings the scientific evidence presented by
experts is often only one part, and sometimes only a small part, of the corpus of
factual evidence before the court. Ravetz then cautions against outside scholars
drawing conclusions about the use or misuse of science in legal proceedings
without considering the total context in which those conclusions are used.
Herbert Kritzer’s article, The Arts of Persuasion in Science and Law,
expands further on Haack’s and Ravetz’s themes by explicitly drawing attention
to the courtroom as a setting for persuasion rather than for truth.7 He suggests
four dimensions on which scientific investigations and legal investigations can
be compared: the choice of “data” or evidence, how the evidence is used, the
mindset of the inquirer, and the goals of the inquiry. In a common-law
courtroom, Krtitzer points out, much of the evidence is presented through oral
testimony and focuses on specific events, whereas science is oriented toward
conclusions that apply across situations. Partisanship rules in the presentation of
the evidence, and much of the persuasion process is oriented toward creating
doubt, as opposed to furthering science’s quest for certainty. An important
theme running through Kritzer’s article, consistent with Ravetz’s essay, is that
the courtroom setting creates conditions that are unfavorable to the neutral
presentation of scientific findings.

5. Susan Haack, Irreconcilable Differences? The Troubled Marriage of Science and Law, 72 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (Winter 2009).
6. Jerome R. Ravetz, Essay, Conventions in Science and in the Courts: Images and Realities, 72
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 25 (Winter 2009).
7. Herbert M. Kritzer, The Arts of Persuasion in Science and Law: Conflicting Norms in the
Courtroom, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 41 (Winter 2009).
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Joseph Sanders’ article on expert witnesses builds upon the preceding
articles.8 He further explores the elements of adversarialism in American legal
proceedings by examining evidence presented in the litigation against Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, whose morning-sickness product Bendectin allegedly
caused horrific birth defects after women took the drug. Using his background
in sociology, Sanders explores two themes that emerge from the case study of
Bendectin. The first theme is “role” pressures: the adversary system replaces
the expert’s role as an impartial investigator with a partisan role. The second,
related, theme is the replacement of the standard of scientific rigor with a looser
standard focused on the specific issues at play in litigation. Sanders concludes
by pointing out that, despite many differences, law and science share many
conventions, and each has a preferred goal of reaching a proper outcome.
Charles Bazerman’s How Does Science Come to Speak in the Courts starts
with the seemingly very mundane observation that law and science use different
conventions for the forms in which supporting literature is cited.9 In law the
purpose is to build decisions on precedents, the memories of and standards on
which prior cases have been decided. In science, standard citation procedures
serve a roughly similar purpose, namely, a way of helping to maintain quality.
Then Bazerman turns to consider how the differing conventions for citation in
epidemiology played out in litigation over the drug phenylpropanolamine, used
as an appetite suppressant that allegedly caused hemorrhagic strokes. The
Daubert hearings in the litigation show a remarkable change in the court’s
citation of literature and a tilt toward a legal, as opposed to a scientific,
perspective on the evidence.
David Kriebel’s How Much Evidence is Enough? shifts our focus to the use
of evidence in regulatory settings.10 As he asserts in his opening paragraph, a
“clash of cultures” also occurs around the use of science in the development and
alteration of regulations. Echoing points made in the preceding articles, Kriebel
draws attention to the fact that not all scientific research that is undertaken can
be considered to have the goal of “pure” science. Environmental-health science
is a prime example. Research on environmental hazards is directed toward
informing policymakers, but there are often major degrees of uncertainty about
causal relationships. Disruptions in natural systems or cycles and their effects
on living things have major effects on humans and other organisms, but
inferences about the causes of the disruptions and their effects involve a great
deal of uncertainty. Yet, for the environmental scientist, there is often an
urgency in offering advice to prevent further harm. Kriebel illustrates the many
methods used by different researchers, depending on their disciplines and the

8. Joseph Sanders, Science, Law, and the Expert Witness, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63 (Winter
2009).
9. Charles Bazerman, How Does Science Come to Speak in the Courts? Citations, Intertexts,
Expert Witnesses, Consequential Facts, and Reasoning, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 91 (Winter 2009).
10. David Kriebel, How Much Evidence Is Enough? Conventions of Causal Inference, 72 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 121 (Winter 2009).
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problems at hand, by considering such disparate fields as anthropology and
molecular biology. His central theme is that causation is a judgment call made
by scientists.
David Rosner’s Trials and Tribulations shifts the focus from science to the
field of history.11 He traces the use of historians as experts in litigation.
Historians have played roles in suits on discrimination and voting rights and,
more recently, in toxic-tort cases involving tobacco, asbestos, lead, and the softdrink industry. Rosner draws attention to the controversy and sometimes bitter
disagreement among scholars, not only about the opinions they have been
prepared to offer but also about the conditions under which they have been
recruited and paid. His article documents what he views as corruptions of
knowledge that are produced by adversarial litigation.
Gary Edmond’s Merton and the Hot Tub is a very salient closing to this
symposium issue.12 Edmond describes the attempts in several Australian
jurisdictions to reduce some of the deleterious effects that the adversarial
system can have on expert testimony through use of the “concurrent evidence”
procedure, known colloquially as “hot tubbing.” Following the example of
England, experts in those courts are now required to explicitly acknowledge
that their obligation in providing testimony is to the court rather than to the
party that retained them. Disagreements between opposing experts are subject
to informal, face-to-face meetings prior to any formal court appearance. In
these meetings, differences between experts’ opinions are discussed and issues
narrowed. Edmonds describes his observations of a number of hearings and
discusses the benefits of the concurrent-evidence procedure. 13

11. David Rosner, Trials and Tribulations: What Happens When Historians Enter the Courtroom,
72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 137 (Winter 2009).
12. Gary Edmond, Merton and the Hot Tub: Scientific Conventions and Expert Evidence In
Australian Civil Procedure, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159 (Winter 2009).
13. New Zealand also uses a similar procedure, which was adopted in 2002. See Code of Conduct
for Expert Witnesses, Schedule 4, r25 High Court Amendment Rules 2002, 2002 S.R. 132, available at
http://www.ifpi.org.nz/Code_of_Conduct_for_Expert_Witnesses.pdf. Neil Vidmar, the co-Special
Editor for this issue, recently testified under these rules in Solicitor-General of New Zealand v. Fairfax
New Zealand Ltd. and Pankhurst (High Court, Wellington CIV 2008-485-000705, Oct. 10, 2008)
(unpublished, on file with author) in a contempt-of-court hearing involving charges of publishing
proscribed documents in a criminal proceeding. He and the opposing expert met via an informal
telephone conference prior to the formal court hearing, discussed their differences of opinion and
wrote a joint “aide memoire” to the court outlining the points of agreement and disagreement in their
respective opinions. Subsequently, they testified in formal video-link testimony before a two-judge
panel.

